



FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

VOLUME 37 NUMBER 18

Is Ike Trying to 'Prussianize' Pentagon?

by Telford Taylor

The "great debate" on the President's plan for reorganization of the national defense establishment has produced more than the usual quota of pejoratives. The Secretary of Defense, it is said, will be a "tsar," the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a "man on horseback" (a throwback to General Boulanger), and the Joint Staff, a "Prussian-type general staff." If so, it would appear that we would have a Russian Secretary, a French Chairman and a German General Staff, thus providing a fertile new field of inquiry for the House Un-American Activities Committee.

Critics of the plan have most frequently charged that it embodies the Prussian general staff system. Chairman Carl Vinson, Democrat of Georgia, of the House Armed Services Committee and Senator Styles Bridges, Republican of New Hampshire, are prominent among those who have voiced this fear, aroused by the increased authority to be given the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In the light of American military history it is indeed ironical that the Germans should now be used as a stick with which to beat protagonists of the President's plan. During the half century from the War between the States

to World War I, Prussian military organization was our model. General William Tecumseh Sherman thought the German system "absolutely perfect," and in 1876 he sent abroad the Commandant of West Point, Major General Emory Upton, to study German and other European military systems. Elihu Root, Secretary of War and sponsor of the War Department reorganization of 1903, also greatly admired the Prussian general staff, and contemporary American military literature shows deep interest in and emulation of the German system.

Despite defeat in two world wars the Germans are still highly regarded in professional military circles. It is popular distaste for the ideologies and excesses of Kaisers and *Führers*, *Junkers* and Nazis that has so tarnished the German escutcheon and turned the phrase, "Prussian general staff," into an epithet.

Complicated as are its provisions, the essential purpose of the President's plan is simple. The aim is to increase the authority of the Department of Defense over the three services—Army, Navy and Air Force—which are its principal components. There is a sharp division of opinion within the services about the

JUNE 1, 1958

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION INCORPORATED
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wisdom of this power shift. Opposition in Congress is widespread, partly on the merits, and partly because congressional power, in the field of military affairs thrives on the autonomy of the individual services and dissension among and within them. Naturally, therefore, it is now being said that the President's plan will result in the domination of all three services by a single commander and a single general staff—a "Prussian-type general staff."

But the parallel invoked in this assumption is a mistaken one. In no significant respect have German military organization and practice reflected the features which, it is charged, are present or imminent in the President's proposal.

Germany Not Like U.S.

Prussia was a land power, and interservice problems did not arise in Germany until the era of Wilhelm II, Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz and the Navy League. The Kaiser regarded the navy as his personal property and dealt directly with the admiralty and naval staff, brooking little intervention by his chancellor. During World War I, the chief of naval staff was stationed at the imperial headquarters, but there was only the loosest coordination of naval and army operations.

During the Weimar Republic, before the rise of the Nazis, the army and navy had separate commanders and staffs. This arrangement was carried on under Hitler, and when the *Luftwaffe* emerged in 1935 it also

had its own commander-in-chief, Hermann Göring, its own general staff, and even a separate air ministry.

For only three years during modern German history has there been a single commander in chief, other than the chief of state himself, over all three military services. This was from 1935 to 1938, when General Werner von Blomberg held the title of war minister and commander-in-chief of the *Wehrmacht*. But Hitler sacked him in 1938 and appointed no successor. Thereafter, and throughout World War II, each of the three services preserved its individuality of command and each had its own general staff.

Blomberg as war minister had a very small military staff at his disposal, and after his dismissal Hitler expanded this staff and gave it the title, High Command of the *Wehrmacht*. But it amounted to little more than a personal military secretariat for the *Führer* and never approached the proportions of an armed forces general staff.

No Unification in Germany

Far from being dominated by a single commander or staff, the three branches of the *Wehrmacht* remained fiercely jealous, independent and mutually mistrustful of each other. Military operations suffered grievously and repeatedly from faulty interservice planning and decision-making, a defect for which we and our wartime allies had abundant reason to be grateful.

Of course, within the army the

general staff was very powerful, although far less so after World War I than before. During the last part of that war Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg and General Erich von Ludendorff dominated the civilian chancellors, and the Kaiser became increasingly a figurehead. During the early Weimar years and until Hindenburg was elected president, the chief of the army command, General Hans von Seeckt, wielded considerable political as well as military power.

But these developments were in no way due to a single military command or staff. As shown above, such was not the German system. The power of a Hindenburg or a Seeckt was the product of deeper conditions and factors, such as the enormous prestige and irresponsible autonomy of the German officer corps, resentful as it was of civilian authority and contemptuous of politicians and parliaments.

American traditions are notably different. Whatever may be the effects of the President's plan, nothing therein indicates a tendency to Prussianize our social and political outlook. Nor will wise solutions of the vexed and portentous problems dealt with in the President's plan be aided by this mistaken and confusing invocation of German military history.

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Published twice a month by the FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, INC., 345 East 46th Street, New York 17, N.Y., U.S.A. EDITORIAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE: JOHN S. BADEAU • ROBERT R. BOWIE • BENJAMIN J. BUTTENWIESER • EDWIN F. CHINLUND • HENRY STEELE COMMAGER • BROOKS EMENY • AUGUST HECKSCHER • HAROLD F. LINDER • MARGARET PARTON • STEPHEN H. STACKPOLE. • *President*, JOHN W. NASON • *Editor*, VERA MICHELES DEAN • *Washington Contributor*, NEAL STANFORD • *Assistant Editor*, GWEN CROWE. • *The Foreign Policy Association contributes to the public understanding by presenting a cross-section of views on world affairs. The Association as an organization takes no position on international issues. Any opinions expressed in its publications are those of the authors.* • Subscription Rates: \$4.00 a year; single copies 20 cents. RE-ENTERED AS SECOND-CLASS MATTER SEPTEMBER 26, 1951 AT THE POST OFFICE AT NEW YORK, N.Y., UNDER THE ACT OF MARCH 3, 1879. Please allow one month for change of address. Contents of this BULLETIN may be reproduced with credit to the Foreign Policy Association.

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Why Russia Wants 'Parity'

Diplomatic "parity," "balance" or "equality"—or whatever Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev may want to call it—has suddenly become a major East-West issue. And there is far more to it than first meets the eye.

Diplomatic parity refers to Moscow's demand for balanced diplomatic dealings with the West. During World War II and briefly after, East and West met in Big Three and Big Four conferences, but always with the U.S.S.R. outnumbered two-to-one or three-to-one, and this at all levels—heads of government, foreign ministers, ambassadors. It was that way as late as the Geneva conference of 1955, the last summit meeting.

Moscow has never liked this imbalance in political and diplomatic talks with the West, which it regards as a blow to Russia's national prestige. But only last autumn did the Russians come out into the open and make clear that the days of diplomatic imbalance, or inequality, were over.

The timing of this display of national pride, power and independence is significant. Moscow had just sent up two sputniks. Its world prestige zoomed with the rockets. The Russians were also challenging the United States in world trade and foreign aid—with mounting success. And the U.S.S.R. had just opened its campaign for another summit meeting.

At that time Moscow's demand for parity, strangely enough, made very little impression in Western capitals. Even though Khrushchev said publicly again and again that any future East-West talks would have to be balanced, Washington, London and Paris paid little attention to him.

Finally, when it became clear in Washington that the U.S.S.R. was definitely not going to another summit meeting outnumbered by the non-Communist world, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles said that the United States would have no real objection to a balanced summit meeting. That, he thought, settled the matter.

But Washington apparently did not understand the real meaning of parity and why it was so important to the Russians. In any case, things went along until April, when the three Western ambassadors in Moscow appeared at the Soviet foreign office to discuss summit preparations with Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko. They were not received jointly, but by definite prearrangement were shown, one by one, into Mr. Gromyko's office. Mr. Gromyko explained to each of them that the three ambassadors could be seen together, but if so, then Poland and Czechoslovakia would have to join the U.S.S.R. to give balance to these ambassadorial talks. At first Britain wanted to accept this balance in low-level conversations. But after some exchanges with Washington it decided against it. For meanwhile Mr. Dulles had become increasingly aware of the basic danger of parity if accepted as a diplomatic principle.

Dangerous Implications

The danger of parity lies in its implications for the future conduct of international affairs—not for heads of government or foreign minister meetings, or ambassadorial talks in anticipation of summit conversations. At all these gatherings, regardless of the number of conferees,

agreements have to be unanimous. There is no voting, no majority decision, and one dissenting power can veto anything. Therefore it does no good for one point of view to be in the majority. It is unanimity or nothing, and thus the Russians gain nothing but a little prestige by insisting on parity.

But if they can establish the principle of parity in summit and pre-summit talks they have gone a long way toward establishing it across the board in all international dealings. And there lies the danger. For in United Nations committees, whose members are selected for each topic under discussion, including disarmament, there is voting. It is true that UN committees can only recommend. But, psychologically, in terms of propaganda, it can be very important which point of view carries a majority.

The reason is this. If parity in UN committees is established as a working principle, then with as many Communist nations as Western nations present on any committee, the ground is set for a constant deadlock. The Western nations could stymie the Communist group—but so could the Communist group stymie the West. Each group would in fact, as well as in effect, then, have a veto over any action. The result would be constant deadlock.

But bad as a deadlock would be, the real danger of parity everywhere is that it would actually give the Russians a majority they so desperately seek, and which they can so effectively use in their propaganda. Only now is this prospect dawning on American officials, with all its far-

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Identifying Ourselves with the Future

Walter Lippmann, who on May 5 was deservedly honored with a Pulitzer citation for his "wisdom, perception and high sense of responsibility," said in one of his recent columns that in the continuing struggle of ideas and economics with the U.S.S.R., we must "identify ourselves with the future." In his view, and in that of other seasoned students of world affairs, the United States, in spite of admirable intentions and many impressive achievements since World War II, has too often either associated itself, or has seemed to the rest of the world to associate itself, with the past—with feudal regimes in the Middle East, with anti-reform dictatorships in Latin America, with leaders who no longer rule the majority of their peoples. The danger, as these observers see it, is that outworn institutions may suddenly collapse and no-longer popular leaders may disappear, leaving us with gaping voids in areas of the world where we had counted on bases and allies.

Many Americans may contend that this is a false or unfair view of the United States. Yet the fact that this view exists not only abroad but also at home, makes it necessary to consider whether and how it can be corrected. Vice President Richard M. Nixon, when questioned by students during his good will tour of Latin America about Washington's support of dictatorships in that area, answered, with good reason, that it would be impossible for the United States to take sides in internal politics without being accused of a sin at least as grievous in the eyes of nationalists—the sin of intervention. Yet the question persists whether the United States, through such measures as

military aid, is not putting weapons into the hands of dictators, who use them to suppress those who are fighting for "the future" in their own countries, rather than for our intended aim of preventing Soviet aggression.

What Is 'the Future'?

But what is "the future" with which we might strive to identify ourselves? No man can claim to anticipate with scientific accuracy the shape of things to come 50 or 100 years from now; and even scientists, who have the advantage of working under the controlled conditions of laboratories and not among the uncontrolled conditions of free-wheeling human beings, have miscalculated by a wide margin such portentous events as the possibility of reaching the moon.

It would be dangerous also if, in our effort to counteract Marxist determinism, we were to resort to anti-Marxist determinism. It is no more possible to assert today that communism is "the wave of the future," as the Russians believe, than it was to accept this view of Nazism when it was propounded in a famous American book of the 1930's. But neither is it possible to assert that communism is unchangeable or to assume that Western democracy will triumph unless it, too, continues to adapt itself to changing circumstances.

But while dogmatism of any kind is out of place in speculating about the future, several trends have been increasingly visible since World War I and are now coming to a climax.

First, we have witnessed the spread of nationalism, which was such a powerful force in molding the na-

tion-states of Western Europe and the New World, to the non-Western areas of the Middle East, Asia and Africa. While Westerners deprecate the explosions and dislocations caused by 20th-century nationalism, they must face the fact that either they will accept its existence with equanimity or, if possible, even enthusiasm, or else they will have to leave this particular battleground to the Russians, who are now championing nationalism irrespective of whether or not it is led by Communists. And we could score points against Moscow by stoutly defending nationalism in Eastern Europe, as Marshal Tito is doing in the case of Yugoslavia. But most important of all, we could associate ourselves with the future by rethinking the concept of national sovereignty. For we can hardly demand that the new nations abstain from invoking sovereignty if we ourselves are not prepared to set the example.

Nature of Russia's Challenge

Second, we must squarely face the fact that Russia's appeal to the underdeveloped areas of the world, which contain the majority of its population, is due primarily not to the attractions of Communist ideology or to admiration for Russia as a national state, but to a similarity of experience. Allen W. Dulles, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, made this point very clear in his unusually frank discussion of the U.S.S.R. before the United States Chamber of Commerce on April 28. Moscow, he said, is now directly challenging the United States in the fields of industrial development and foreign trade and aid as well as in

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Turkey: Problems and Prospects

by Dwight J. Simpson

Dr. Simpson, assistant professor of political science at Williams College, has spent the past year in Turkey and the Middle East as a Ford Foundation Fellow conducting research on Middle Eastern affairs. This is his second visit to the Middle East since 1952.

ISTANBUL—The Republic of Turkey is today an interesting example of a traditionally backward, underdeveloped country making enormous efforts to modernize and industrialize itself. And because Turkey's self-imposed task of development is so ambitious, it is small wonder that the country, after nearly ten years of forced-draft effort, is showing considerable signs of strain.

Turkey's economic condition today provides the world with a fresh reminder that the development of underdeveloped countries is a task which is not as simple as it looks. Indeed, the early postwar optimism, brought to Turkey by successive waves of Marshall Plan representatives and Point Four administrators and technicians, has for the most part vanished. No longer is it possible to find experienced American officials here who argue that massive injections of American financial and technical aid will quickly and securely propel Turkey into the ranks of the modern industrial nations. Experience shows that the development of a backward economy such as Turkey's often raises at least as many new problems as it solves, and some of the "new" problems in Turkey—such as the social and political tensions and dislocations caused by rapid economic development—are so subtle and complex that no early solution of them is in sight.

Accent on Industrialization

At the same time, there is no doubt that in the past decade Turkey has made great material progress, as even a mere glance at production charts

and statistics will show. Moreover, the progress is particularly impressive, even spectacular, if it is judged by prevalent Middle Eastern standards. A great deal has been done to extend Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's political and social revolution of 30 years ago into the economic and technical spheres. And in this sense the present Turkish government, since 1950 under the driving leadership of its mercurial Premier Adnan Menderes, is seeking to fulfill the revolution Atatürk began in 1923.

The accent has been on industrialization, and today Turkey has over 5,000 factories. Some of these, of course, are only tiny enterprises employing a handful of workers and producing minute quantities of high priced and rather shoddy goods. But, equipped with the latest modern machinery, there are also scores of Turkish factories which reach a high standard. Such installations are adding handsomely to the ever increasing volume of local industrial output. For instance, home-produced sugar and cement now supply the country's needs. This has expanded Turkey's industrial base and, at the same time, has saved large amounts of precious foreign exchange formerly spent by Turkey for importing light industry goods from abroad.

Agricultural output has also risen spectacularly. Thanks to improved farming and distribution techniques, a widespread system of agricultural credits and an increasing use of modern farm machinery, Turkey's total agricultural output has risen over 50 percent in less than ten years. And the amount of heavy construction has

increased dramatically every year since 1950, both in monetary value and in absolute terms. The result of this activity is noticeable even to the casual tourist. New roads, dams, power transmission lines, ports, railways, bridges and public buildings of every kind have drastically altered the face of the land.

Shaky Foundations

If development meant only to industrialize rapidly, to raise agricultural output sharply and to plunge ahead with massive capital construction projects, then there would be little cause for concern in Turkey. But if one looks carefully at this new economic structure one is justifiably alarmed to note that the structure's foundations are in danger of being undermined by the twin evils of rampant domestic inflation and a gigantic foreign debt. Statistics can be made to serve as an antidote to complacency and overoptimism, and in Turkey the statistics show conclusively that, due mainly to inflation, the real national income per capita has declined steadily in each of the past five years. Between 1953 and 1957 the cost of living has risen over 50 percent, and estimates covering the last ten months project an even sharper annual rise. Preliminary figures now available suggest that 1957 will prove to have been the worst inflationary year in Turkey's economic history. At the same time the mounting foreign trade deficit has increased total foreign indebtedness to nearly \$2 billion—a truly alarming figure when it is balanced against an annual gross national product estimated be-

tween \$5 billion and \$7 billion. A convenient and quite accurate means of measuring Turkey's economic health is the local black market in currency. Istanbul black-market traders sell the Turkish lira at approximately 500 percent discount.

Reasons for Plight

Economic experts, as is their habit, disagree about the principal causes of Turkey's economic plight, and the result is that no suggested remedies find uncritical acceptance. But on one basic point most of the experts seem united: Turkey has an excessive amount of its national investment in enterprises which are not yet productive. Translated into everyday language, this formulation of the economists means simply that Turkey has attempted to do too much, too fast, with too little. For example, it takes many years for the power from the many large and cruelly expensive hydroelectric installations to pay for themselves by means of supplying needed electric power to an expanding industry.

There are other outstanding weaknesses, chief among which is a five-year series of "highest ever" deficit budgets. And of each budget 30 percent on the average has been spent on economic development, thus adding more annual inflationary pressure. There are also the economic evils of bank reserves which are not really reserves at all but are loaned out regularly by the State Bank to industrial development schemes; lavish export subsidies that encourage noncompetitive Turkish export industries to engage in world trade; excessive agricultural credits; and an outstandingly unjust taxation system which penalizes the urban population while benefiting the rural. Finally, there is the old-fashioned resort to the printing press: notes in circulation are far in excess of the needs of a healthy economy.

The most recent national elections were held in October 1957, when Premier Adnan Menderes and his Democratic party won, but only by the narrowest possible margin. Since then, due to the appalling shortages of all kinds of consumer goods, including food, a substantial body of the Turkish electorate has been having some serious second thoughts about the government's approach to economic tasks.

Political Unrest

There is considerable political unrest in Turkey today, and most of it is directly traceable to the government's economic policies. Critics of the Democratic party argue that the major evil is "planlessness." This point is in many respects well taken. It is a fact that the government has never published a plan or even an outline giving the impression that an orderly, balanced development of the country and its resources was under way. As a result, there are cases of waste, duplication and the misuses of funds, resources and manpower. Moreover, a sizable number of Turkish industrial projects have been undertaken, not for their own intrinsic soundness, but for the political advantages to be gained. Thus one can observe new factories being built in provincial locations far removed from transportation facilities or raw material sources only for the reason that the inhabitants of the province concerned appear, in the judgment of the Democratic party, to need extra encouragement to vote the straight ticket on election day.

Another outcome of the government's Draconian economic policies has been the impact on Turkish civil liberties. Political opposition to the government, again rooted in growing economic discontent, has met with stern government reprisals. The government of Premier Menderes has gone to extreme lengths to silence its

opposition critics, and it has achieved considerable success. Opposition newspapers have been a favorite government target, and repressive penalties, including heavy fines, jail sentences and the withholding of newsprint supplies have been meted out to writers, editors, publishers and cartoonists, most of whom were guilty only of disagreeing publicly with Menderes and his policies.

In many respects the turbulent condition of international affairs has proved a blessing to the Turkish government. When internal unrest appeared to be reaching a danger point, the international crisis that developed about the Middle East in the past year had the effect of diverting public attention from the government's policies. Russia, tsarist or Communist, has been the historic enemy of the Turks, and since 1948, which brought the Truman Doctrine and the beginnings of an ever closer Turkish alliance with the West, Russia has shown itself perceptibly more hostile to Turkey.

Middle East Crisis

During the Syrian incident in 1957, when the Syrians claimed, quite falsely, that Turkey was menacing their borders, Soviet spokesmen openly threatened Turkey with "annihilation." And now that Syria has joined with Egypt in the United Arab Republic, Turkey is faced with an ostensibly neutralist but openly pro-Soviet state across its southern border. The Communist and crypto-Communist ring is closing around Turkey—with Russia to the north, Bulgaria to the west, and Syria to the south. These developments have had the external effect of driving Turkey ever more firmly into the arms of its NATO alliance partners and the Baghdad pact, and the internal effect of causing many opposition leaders, in view of the seriousness of the international situation, to moderate or

even to forego much of their anti-government criticism.

The Cyprus Problem

Another attention-diverting international problem is the festering sore of Cyprus. This unhappy island, a British Crown Colony, which lies just 40 miles off Turkey's southern coast, continues to be the scene of rioting, strikes and bloodshed. The majority of the Cypriot Greeks still demand *Enosis* (political union of Cyprus with mainland Greece), while the Cypriot Turks, under the resourceful leadership of Dr. Fazil Kuchuk, argue with equal steadfastness that "Cyprus is Turkish" (this is the name of his party) and insist on partition of the island. Although this has not been publicly declared, it is understood that the Cypriot Turks, and Turkey itself, would compromise to the extent of abandoning their demands for partition and agree to continued British occupation and control of the island. But all Turks are united in insisting that Turkey will never agree to placing Cyprus under Greek control.

Tempers reach fever heat on this issue, and an observer would have to look far and wide in Turkey to find any dissent from the majority position. As in the past several months, the Cyprus problem is still hopelessly deadlocked, with no sign of a compromise on the horizon. Inside Turkey this means that the emotion-ridden issue is likely to continue to distract public attention from restrictions on civil liberties, rising prices, consumer shortages and the haunting specter of fiscal bankruptcy.

So far as one can determine, Premier Menderes appears to feel that Turkey's now somewhat faltering march toward the goal of industrialization and economic plenty can be resumed at a quickened pace if only two factors are present: time and money. He appears to calculate that

at least five years will be needed before the rapidly expanded economy comes into a reasonable state of balance and the many development projects begin to bear abundant fruit. Money, in large amounts, will thus also be needed during this stabilizing period, not for any significant further expansion, but merely to keep the economy afloat.

Time and Money

Since 1947, American loans and gifts to Turkey have totaled nearly 2.5 billion dollars. In addition, Turkey has obtained large loans and credits from other Western-world sources. Whether shrewdly or foolishly, all the money obtained has been spent, and thus for over a year the Turks have besought the United States for an extra \$300 million in addition to the regular annual \$200 million of military aid and \$150 million of economic aid. The American government has been stalling on this Turkish request, and in Turkish political circles this is taken as a sign that Premier Menderes' hitherto great supply of political luck may have run out. For it was the Democratic party's good fortune to have embarked on its massive development scheme in Turkey at a time when the United States was simultaneously at the height of anti-Communist sentiment and at the peak of an expanding economy. Now, however, although American anticommunism may not have noticeably diminished, it is evident that the American economy has ceased expanding, at least for the moment, and in some respects is actually contracting.

These facts cannot help but be reflected in the future decisions of Congress on foreign-aid appropriations. And if it should prove that the days of large-scale foreign aid are over, then Premier Menderes may have difficult days ahead.

The imminent loss of massive an-

nual American injections of dollars will be painful for Turkey, but it may also bring some hidden benefits which, if they do not wholly compensate, may at least make the ordeal more bearable. It will be a long-range blessing to Turkey if it has to learn the value of careful planning, fiscal integrity and reasonably proper standards of economic management.

But although Turkey may be facing a difficult transition period, its future outlook cannot help but be bright. Turkey is a large, naturally rich nation with no overpopulation problem and little serious domestic strife. Education and social development are rocketing forward, and the Turkish electorate is becoming more and more skilled at handling the complicated machinery of a genuinely democratic state. To be realistic about Turkey and to point out its errors and shortcomings is not to be pessimistic about its future, nor to detract from its already considerable accomplishments. Turkey is rising rapidly and will one day reach a well-merited position of great eminence in the world. To this conclusion Turkey's friends are sure to say resoundingly, "*Inshallah!*," "may God grant it be so!"

READING SUGGESTIONS: G. L. Lewis, *Turkey* (New York, Praeger, 1955); Howard A. Reed, "Secularism and Islam in Turkish Politics," *Current History*, June 1957; Lewis V. Thomas and Richard N. Frye, *The United States and Turkey and Iran* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1951); "Turkey: The Impatient Builder," *Time*, February 3, 1958.

Newsletter

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reaching implications and problems.

The way it would work is this. Suppose a UN committee on a nuclear-test ban were set up. Under the parity principle, there would be an equal number of free world and of Communist representatives. But there would also be a few neutrals—such as India, Indonesia, Egypt. It is all too apparent what would then happen to any resolution. The East

and West members would cancel each other out in any vote; and the decision would then be made by the neutrals—who, from our experience generally vote with the U.S.S.R. Thus parity in diplomatic relations—which last autumn, and even this spring, seemed innocuous—could end, not by just creating a deadlock in any discussions, but by actually giving Moscow an absolute majority.

Parity, then, is like the camel's nose in the tent. If allowed at the ambassadorial level it will be hard to oppose parity at the foreign ministers' level; and if allowed at the foreign ministers' level it will be difficult to keep parity out of a summit gathering. And if allowed in the summit negotiations it may well be insisted on everywhere—and then so-called diplomatic equality could suddenly become an absolute Communist majority. This is the real meaning of parity—and the real reason why the Russians are fighting so hard to establish it as a diplomatic principle.

NEAL STANFORD

Spotlight

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military matters. What is the nature of this challenge?

"Moscow's foreign-aid program has particular appeal," Mr. Dulles declared, "in the undeveloped countries because Russia until so recently was an undeveloped country itself.

For some reason, the recently liberated countries seem to feel that the Kremlin has found a new magic formula for quick industrialization, which is the hallmark of becoming a modern state to many of these countries. They recognize American economic and industrial leadership in the world but they feel that the democratic process of economic development may be too slow. . . . In the newly developing countries, the drive for economic betterment has become a crusade, not always based on reason."

In this crusade, the underdeveloped countries thus identify Russia's experience with their own future. How could the United States, which was first in starting a foreign-aid program after World War II, make it possible for the underdeveloped countries to maintain their belief in our concern for their future in the difficult decades ahead?

Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who was the first to present in public the ideas ultimately incorporated in the Marshall Plan, answered this question at a Jefferson-Jackson Day dinner in Detroit on May 3. In this speech Mr. Acheson pointed out the third important trend today—the urgent need for more extensive, more varied and more stable aid by the West to the non-Western world.

"Peoples everywhere," said Mr. Acheson, "demand an expanding life. Khrushchev promises the faithful and the uncommitted that Communist economics will produce this result. Only a blind man can doubt that it is turning out an impressive performance. Only a blind man can also doubt that the free world is not doing the job." If the job is to be done, the West, in his opinion, must take three "drastic steps." These are, "first, a substantial increase in the export of capital, both governmental and private, from North America and Western Europe; then, a substantial increase in imports into dollar areas, chiefly the United States; and, finally, an overhauling of our international financial institutions, principally the International Monetary Fund, to make possible the expansion of world exchange reserves and the provision of more credit where it can be most effective."

These proposals, Mr. Acheson added, "do not sound like words to inspire men to charge barricades." But throughout history "the future" at any given time of profound change, such as the world is experiencing today, has been decided in many other places, and by many other methods, than fighting at barricades. Nor is it inevitable that it be decided by a race in nuclear weapons.

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FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

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